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SUMMARY
We address the issue of how early retirement may interact with limited use of
financial markets in producing financial hardship later in life, when some risks
(such as long-term care) are not insured. We argue that the presence of finan-
cially attractive early retirement schemes in a world of imperfect financial and
insurance markets can lead to an ‘early retirement trap’. Indeed, Europe
witnesses many (early) retired individuals in financial distress. In our analysis
we use data on 10 European countries, which differ in their pension and
welfare systems, in prevailing retirement age and in households’ access to
financial markets. We find evidence that an early retirement trap exists, particu-
larly in some Southern and Central European countries: people who retired
early in life are more likely to be in financial hardship in the long run. Our
analysis implies that governments should stop making early retirement attractive,
let retirees go back to work, improve access to financial markets and make sure
long-term care problems are adequately insured.
— Viola Angelini, Agar Brugiavini and Guglielmo Weber
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1. INTRODUCTION
Life expectancy has risen steadily over the last half a century in all developed coun-
tries: in 1960 life expectancy at birth was around 70 years of age in most Western
European countries and the US (and higher in Sweden and Denmark, at 72–73), it
is now 79 or higher (with the exception of Denmark and the US, at 78).
This dramatic increase in expected length of life, coupled with much improved
health conditions but for the very last years of life, implies that for most individuals
aged less than 70–75 there is the capacity to contribute to society in various ways,
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that range from paid work, to voluntary work, to the care of other family members
(grandchildren, old parents, etc.). Retirement age has increased in most countries,
but less than life expectancy and this implies that individuals must make careful
and skilful use of financial resources, that should support their consumption over a
much longer retirement period than a few decades ago.
At present, Europe witnesses the presence of large fractions of individuals who
have retired aged 65 or younger. Most of the young old who are currently retired
were induced to retire early by substantial financial incentives (see Gruber and
Wise, 2004, for an appraisal). Yet, we shall document, using newly released data on
a host of European countries (second wave of SHARE – the Survey on Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe), that surprisingly large fractions of retired indi-
viduals report ‘difficulties with making ends meet’.
In this paper we investigate a possible reason for such widespread financial distress
in old age. We argue that the presence of financially attractive early retirement
schemes in a world of imperfect financial and insurance markets can lead to an early
retirement trap. We present a model where individuals are induced to retire early by a
generous early retirement scheme in the public pension system, but find themselves in
financial hardship later because of negative health-related shocks with long-term conse-
quences. A key element of this model is that markets are incomplete: in these circum-
stances postponing retirement would be an effective second best way for consumers to
partially insure against negative shocks. The generosity of early retirement incentives
in at least some countries makes individuals less sensitive to the option value of post-
poning retirement.1 We notice that in economies where financial and insurance mar-
kets do not operate well pensions are typically more generous: a possible reason is that
in countries with incomplete markets governments have opted for paying higher bene-
fits to the retirees, in order to encourage informal risk-sharing arrangements (Lindbeck
and Persson, 2003). The evidence we produce suggest that these informal risk-sharing
agreements are not working as well as formal financial and insurance markets.
In fact, we do find evidence that such an early retirement trap exists in some
European countries, in the sense that people who retired early in life are more
likely to be in financial hardship in the long run.
This suggests the following policy conclusions: first, early retirement should be
made less advantageous for those who have not yet retired; second, measures
should be introduced to make it easier for currently retired individuals to take up
paid work. These policy recommendations should be seen in the more general
framework of the Lisbon agenda that suggests a range of policies aimed at reducing
the unused labour capacity of the elderly in Europe.
We also document that financial distress is affected by the failure to hold risky
financial assets or mortgages. To the extent that this is driven by lack of financial
1 Stock and Wise (1990) are the first to use the concept of ‘option value’ of work and retirement.
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literacy or high transaction costs, a third policy conclusion, therefore, is to improve
access to financial markets.
A fourth policy conclusion has to do with the specific source of risk that is left
uninsured. If, as implicit in our model, what affects individuals most is the risk of
long-term poor health or disability, the provision of long-term care insurance may
be the best solution to reduce financial distress in old age. If market failures prevent
private insurance companies from offering attractive long-term care contracts, then
direct public provision may be necessary.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the existing literature
on unused labour capacity and on unused financial capacity, we provide fresh
graphical evidence from the SHARE data on both topics, and present a simple
three-period model of the early retirement trap. In Section 3 we further describe
the SHARE data, discuss the identification strategy and present econometric evi-
dence on the role played by labour and financial unused capacity on the probability
of financial hardship. Section 4 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW, GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE
In this paper we bring together two separate lines of research, which we briefly review
in this section. The first documents the existence of a large unused labour capacity among
the young old, the second focuses on the presence of a substantial unused financial capacity.
We do this by using data collected in the second wave of SHARE (Survey on
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) in 2006–7. SHARE is an interdisciplin-
ary survey on ageing that is run every two years on representative samples of the
individuals aged 50 or more and their spouses in a host of European countries (see
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2005 and 2008, for further information). In this paper we pres-
ent evidence for ten countries, where we could compute some key retirement
eligibility indicators. These countries range from the North (Sweden and Denmark)
to the South (Italy and Spain), but otherwise belong to Western-Central Europe
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). Eastern
European countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Greece that are
covered by SHARE were instead excluded from our analysis.
2.1. Unused labour capacity
The existence and level of unused labour capacity is partly supply, partly demand dri-
ven. On the demand side, firms might find it costly to retain older workers if their pro-
ductivity diminishes (or remains constant) while the wage profile is increasing with age
in an automatic fashion (as it is often the case in countries where employment protec-
tion is high and labour contracts are decided on a national level or at the level of
industry). The existence of age-related demand shocks to employment suggests the
need for the welfare state to provide good unemployment and disability insurance for
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the young old, that are already in place in Nordic and some Central European coun-
tries, but are conspicuously absent in Southern European countries.
However, the early retirement literature has emphasized that most workers take
early retirement options because they are financially advantageous. As pointed out
in a number of contributions (Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004; OECD, 2006; Blo¨ndal
and Scarpetta, 1998; Brugiavini et al., 2002), in many developed countries a large
fraction of healthy young old people could work but do not because of the financial
incentives provided by the public pension system rules to retire early. With the
Lisbon Pact, the European Council has invited all member states to introduce poli-
cies aimed at increasing employment for females and young old (individuals aged
between 50 and 65).
Evidence of unused labour capacity is also available in the SHARE data. Figure 1
shows that very large fractions of individuals aged 50–64 are retired in most coun-
tries. A very similar picture can be obtained by focusing on individuals who are
fully functioning,2 ruling out a key role of poor health in determining early exits
from the labour force. In the figure, and throughout this paper, we focus on heads
of household: within couples, we define a person to be the head if he or she is the
only one with a work-history, but if both spouses have a work-history the head is
taken to be the man.
Figure 1 shows striking differences between neighbouring countries such as Aus-
tria and Germany or Switzerland: in Austria a much larger fraction of individuals
are retired. This is in line with the more generous financial incentives for early
retirement available in Austria compared to Germany or Switzerland.
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Figure 1. Economic activity of household heads, aged 50–64
2 An individual is established to be ‘functioning’ on the basis of self-reported health indicators which establish the number of
limitations in activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental activities (IADL). An individual is ‘functioning’ if no limitation
is reported.
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Figure 1 also shows that an important role is played in some countries by disabil-
ity insurance (the Netherlands and Denmark) and unemployment (mostly Germany
– former East Germans).
Figure 2 shows histograms of actual retirement age by country – a vertical line
marks age 60. Retirement age is based on a recall question asked to the retired.
The data refer to heads of households, that is to both men and women, and this
explains why the sample densities are often bimodal. The most striking feature is
the difference between countries like Sweden and Denmark on the one hand, and
Austria and Italy on the other. In the former, few retired before age 60, in the lat-
ter most retired aged 60 or less. In the case of the Netherlands the picture is some-
what misleading, because respondents on disability insurance were not asked the
question, and therefore we do not observe the whole of the left tail of the distribu-
tion. This fact (that could apply also to other countries, such as Belgium, Denmark
and Spain) should be kept in mind in interpreting the evidence we produce.
One final piece of information that is directly available in SHARE is the propor-
tion of currently employed individuals (aged 50 or more) who wish to retire as soon
as possible: this ranges from little over 25% in Sweden and Switzerland, to 48% in
France, 55% in Italy and 66% in Spain.
These large fractions of working individuals who look forward to retirement sug-
gest that job-pension eligibility is an important determinant of the retirement deci-
sion. The variability across countries further suggests that differences in economic
and institutional incentives play a key role in explaining unused labour capacity.
2.2. Unused financial capacity
The existence of unused financial capacity is less well documented and has
attracted less attention in the economic policy debate than unused labour capacity.
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Figure 2. Histograms of retirement age by country
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And yet, differences across European countries in portfolio choice and in home
equity release are even more striking.
In practically all countries equity attracts a premium – at least in the long run.
Yet, equity holdings are relatively rare in the population at large of all Southern
and some Central European countries, as discussed in Guiso et al. (2002). More
generally, investment in risky financial assets is limited, and this has the effect of
limiting the ability of consumers to enjoy the benefits of growth (increases in pro-
ductivity typically lead to higher wages, not necessarily higher pensions) and to
hedge macro-wide risks, such as inflation.
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics of various indicators of unused finan-
cial capacity by country and by age: we split the sample between the younger old
(50–64) and the older old (65+).
In column 1 of Table 1 we show the proportions of households who do not hold
any stocks (the variable takes value 1 if the household does not hold stocks directly
or indirectly, including individual retirement accounts and occupational pensions)
by country and age group. We see that equity holdings are much more common in
the younger group (50–64) than in the older group (65+) in all countries, and that
Table 1. Indicators of unused financial capacity and financial hardship by
country and age group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No
stocks (%)
Home-owner
with
mortgage
(%)
Home-
owner
outright
(%)
Non
home-
owner
(%)
Years left
on
mortgage
Debt but
no
mortgage
(%)
Financial
hardship
(%)
Age 50–64
Sweden 5.3 61.6 16.0 22.4 24.7 6.5 14.0
Denmark 7.9 67.8 16.7 15.6 20.3 3.5 9.2
Germany 43.7 25.4 38.0 36.6 9.4 8.2 24.3
Netherlands 15.5 70.3 7.4 22.4 14.7 0.8 14.9
Belgium 38.4 28.0 58.5 13.5 5.8 11.9 25.0
France 36.2 19.6 58.3 22.1 9.2 27.0 31.8
Switzerland 18.0 56.4 6.2 37.4 20.7 0.4 14.1
Austria 72.9 17.0 51.0 32.0 11.4 7.7 21.9
Spain 71.1 22.1 65.2 12.7 9.9 10.3 46.0
Italy 81.6 7.5 76.8 15.7 9.7 10.6 59.9
Age 65+
Sweden 37.0 29.0 41.6 29.4 21.0 6.3 21.0
Denmark 52.4 28.7 36.3 35.0 19.3 3.3 15.4
Germany 82.0 5.9 50.8 43.3 8.0 2.5 23.9
Netherlands 76.0 26.7 22.4 50.9 14.5 0.4 16.4
Belgium 73.9 1.7 75.1 23.2 4.6 4.3 31.2
France 67.2 3.4 69.8 26.9 10.5 16.7 36.3
Switzerland 59.8 34.4 14.7 50.9 20.7 2.1 18.0
Austria 90.3 3.6 49.2 47.3 12.1 4.8 23.8
Spain 92.5 2.4 88.2 9.4 6.2 3.7 56.9
Italy 93.9 2.6 79.6 17.8 5.8 5.3 60.3
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households own stocks much more frequently in Sweden, Denmark, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland. In France, Belgium and Germany more than 50% of the
younger households have some equity holdings, while in Austria, Italy and Spain
participation in the equity markets is much less widespread.
The next three columns provide information on home-ownership. In column (2)
we show the fractions of households who own their home but have a mortgage; in
column (3) the fractions who own outright. The sum of these two columns provides
information on home-ownership overall. Column (4) shows the proportions of
households who do not own their home (they may either rent it, or use it for free –
either provided by their employer or in usufruct).
We see that home-ownership is relatively high in all countries, with the exception
of older households in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps Germany,
where older generations had access to public housing on a mass scale. It is striking
to see how high home-ownership is in Southern European countries and in
Belgium. It seems that countries where participation in risky financial assets is low
are characterized by high home-ownership rates. The question is then whether in
these countries households are able to use the equity locked in their homes to sup-
port their consumption of non-housing goods and services, or whether instead they
are house-rich and cash-poor, as noted for the US by Venti and Wise (2004) and
Mitchell and Piggott (2003), and for European countries by Bridges et al. (2006).
The equity locked up in the house can be released in mainly three ways: by
either moving from owning to renting, trading down or using the house as collat-
eral for secured loans. Selling the home (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2006), and more gen-
erally downsizing (Banks et al., 2007) are extreme forms of housing equity
withdrawal, that are not widely used in most countries, possibly because of their
consumption implications and the high transaction costs involved (both monetary
and psychological). Other forms of equity withdrawal do not affect the consumption
aspect of housing and do not involve moving costs, but require the use of debt
instruments, such as mortgage refinancing (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). Taking up a
new mortgage or refinancing an existing mortgage in old age is quite common in
some countries, quite rare instead in others.
Column (2) highlights the widespread use of mortgages in some countries: Swe-
den, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland, even at older ages. Strikingly,
these four countries are the same where households participate most in equity mar-
kets. Mortgages in older ages are almost unheard of in all remaining countries,
even though non-negligible fractions of mortgagors can be found in the younger
age group in Germany, Belgium, France, Austria and Spain.
As we can see from column (5), in Nordic countries, in Switzerland and the
Netherlands home-owners often have long-lived mortgages that allow them to keep
an adequate standard of living. In these countries the elderly have access to finan-
cial instruments (such as reverse mortgages and equity line schemes) that allow
them to withdraw equity from the house to finance consumption in old-age. How-
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ever, in Mediterranean and some Central European countries mortgages are less
often held, particularly by individuals aged 65 or more, and other forms of debt
are often resorted to – with widespread self-reported financial hardship.
Column (5) highlights that in those countries where mortgages are common in
older ages, they are indeed used to support consumption; that is, households do not
necessarily plan to repay them in full while alive. In Denmark, Sweden and
Switzerland the average residual life of mortgages is around 20 years for individuals
of 65 years of age or more, and in the Netherlands it is around 15 years.
Limited housing equity withdrawal could be due to credit market failures (Bertola
et al., 2006), information problems (Jappelli and Pagano, 2006) or financial illiteracy
(Christelis et al., 2006; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). However, the possibility must
be considered that housing equity is used by elderly parents as a means to attract
attention by their adult children (Bernheim et al., 1985; Angelini, 2007).
More generally, mortgage refinancing can be used not only to support consump-
tion in old age after a negative income or health shock (as stressed by Hurst and
Stafford, 2004), but also to rebalance one’s portfolio in response to house price
changes (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, stress that US baby boomers do this to a
rather limited extent). This second use of mortgages requires a certain degree of
financial sophistication, and low-cost access to financial markets.3
It is of course possible that homeowners in the remaining countries do not wish to
borrow, either for precautionary reasons (to pay for future, uncertain health expenses,
say) or because of a strong bequest motive. However, column (6) shows that in at least
some cases they use other forms of debt to support their non-housing consumption: in
France over 25% of households aged 50–64 who own their home borrow some other
way (instalments credit, unsecured loans etc.), and do not take up a mortgage. Non-
negligible fractions of homeowners do likewise in Spain, Belgium and Italy, and this
may be taken as evidence of either very high transaction costs in the mortgage market
or of scarce knowledge of the financial and debt markets by these consumers.
We have seen so far that in some countries the fraction of individuals who partic-
ipate in financial markets is relatively small, the fraction of homeowners who have
mortgages is also small, and yet there are many who borrow in other forms.
The question is whether in these countries individuals can cope well despite all
this, or whether they face financial hardship of some form. The SHARE question-
naire contains a useful question on this:
‘Thinking of your household’s total monthly income, would you say that your household is
able to make ends meet with great difficulty, with some difficulty, fairly easily or easily?’
3 Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) stress how ‘baby boomers’ in the US rely more on housing equity than other cohorts of indi-
viduals: several factors, including the level of financial literacy or the degree of self-commitment, are potentially valid explana-
tions of this behaviour, what matters most is that these households might end up being excessively exposed to the risks of
house-price bubbles bursts. A similar problem may exist for households in those European countries where portfolios are
tilted toward housing wealth.
472 VIOLA ANGELINI, AGAR BRUGIAVINI AND GUGLIELMO WEBER
In column (7) we display the proportions of households who respond that they
make ends meet with great or some difficulty. This is particularly high (over 50%)
in Spain and Italy, but fractions of 20% or more are found in Belgium, France,
Austria and Germany. The lowest fractions are found in Denmark, Switzerland,
the Netherlands and Sweden, that is, in the four countries where households appear
to make the best use of financial markets and mortgage opportunities. In all other
countries we can argue that there is ample unused financial capacity.
A question that naturally arises when dealing with a self-reported indicator of
financial distress is to what extent country differences are driven by differences in
response styles, and to what extent they instead reflect genuine differences in eco-
nomic circumstances. A way to address this issue is to show how average self-
reported financial distress correlates to indicators that relate to either consumption
or wealth/income.
In Figures 3 and 4 we show how the self-reported financial hardship indicator
correlates with two indicators based instead on consumption of luxury goods and
on availability of liquid assets. In particular, Figure 3 displays the proportion of
households in financial hardship against the proportion of households who report
never to eat out in a normal month. Eating out is of course partly a matter of taste,
partly a matter of relative prices, but in all countries it is a luxury good compared
to eating at home – we can expect households in financial distress to eat out less
often than households with no financial problems, other things being equal. We see
from Figure 3 that there is a strong, positive association between the self-reported
indicator of financial hardship and the indicator based on consumption patterns.
Figure 4 shows the relation between the proportion of households in financial
hardship and the proportion of households whose liquid assets are less than three
times their current monthly income. The latter indicator has been used in the
literature on liquidity constraints, following Zeldes (1989) – for older households
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Figure 3. Proportion of households in financial hardship against the propor-
tion of households who report never to eat out
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this indicator likely captures lack or inability to make the best use of illiquid
wealth. Here again, we observe that there is a strong, positive correlation
between the self-reported measure and this more conventional indicator of finan-
cial hardship.
The issue we are going to investigate in what follows is whether and to what extent
financial hardship is related to both unused labour capacity and unused financial
capacity. A graphical analysis shows that there is prima facie evidence for both
relations. In Figure 5 we display the proportion of households in financial hardship
against the proportion of individuals aged 50–64 who do not work. In Figure 6 we
display the proportion of households in financial hardship against the proportion of
households with no stocks in their portfolios. In both cases we see that there is a
positive association.
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Figure 4. Proportion of households in financial hardship against the propor-
tion of households whose financial wealth is less than three times their
monthly income
CH SE
BEDE
AT
NL
DK
FR
ES
IT
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.60.4 0.7
Not employed (age 50–64)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Fi
na
nc
ia
l h
ar
ds
hi
p
Figure 5. Proportion of households in financial hardship against the propor-
tion of households who do not work
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2.3. The early retirement trap
We have shown above that different fractions of individuals are retired in their late
fifties/early sixties in different European countries – something known in the litera-
ture as unused labour capacity – and argued that these differences may be the
response to early retirement incentives, as stressed in Gruber and Wise (1999,
2004). We have also shown that different fractions of individuals fail to make cor-
rect use of financial and debt markets – something we labelled unused financial
capacity – and that in those countries where unused financial capacity is more com-
mon, larger fractions of individuals face financial hardship. The question we are
going to address in this section is whether and to what extent unused labour and
financial capacity interact in generating financial hardship.
We present in Box 1 a model where individuals are induced to retire early by a gen-
erous early retirement scheme in the public pension system, but find themselves in
financial hardship later because of negative shocks. A key element of this model is that
financial and insurance markets are incomplete: in these circumstances postponing
retirement would be a way for consumers to partially insure against negative shocks
(as argued in Bodie et al., 1992). The early retirement financial incentive is strong
enough to make early retirement optimal ex ante, even though ex post large fractions of
consumers may regret foregoing the insurance opportunities entailed by continued
work. In a world of incomplete markets (limited access to the financial markets, no or
inadequate health and long-term care insurance policies for elderly individuals), this
may prove ex post sub-optimal for those who have indeed been hit by adverse shocks.
We know that the welfare state is quite different across European countries: in some
Southern and Central European countries, the state gives generous pension benefits to
early retirees, in Northern and some other Central European countries instead public
pension benefits are lower, but the public health system provides both acute and long-
term care, and tax incentives are used to induce individuals to contribute to occupational
and private pensions (that invest in equity) and to purchase private health insurance.
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Figure 6. Proportion of households in financial hardship against the propor-
tion of individuals aged 50–64 who do not own stocks
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Box 1. The model
To be more precise on how early retirement can be a trap for forward-look-
ing consumers, we present a 3-period model with incomplete markets: all
individuals work in period 0 and are retired in period 2, but must decide
whether to retire in period 1 or continue working before finding out
whether they are going to be affected by (costly) health problems in period
2. If they retire, they enjoy leisure and receive a pension bE in both periods
1 and 2; if they work in period 1 they can choose hours of work (T ) ‘1),
and receive labour income w(T ) ‘1). Their pension in period 2 will then be
bL.
Formally, individuals maximize an expected utility index in two steps:
first, they choose period 0 consumption (C0) and decide whether to take
early (E) or late (L) retirement. Next, they observe the health shock realiza-
tion that will affect them in period 2. If they have chosen to retire early,
they decide how much consumption to allocate to periods 1 and 2 (C1, C2);
if instead they have chosen to retire late, they also decide how much leisure
(‘1) to enjoy in period 1.
Expected life-time utility is:
U ðC0; ‘0Þ þ 11þ dmaxE ;‘ E
$ U ðCL1 ; ‘1Þ þ
1
1þ dU ðC
L
2 ;T Þ
! "
; U ðCE1 ;T Þ þ
1
1þ dU ðC
E
2 ;T Þ
! "# $
where d is their time preference parameter.
This is maximized subject to the following constraints:
AL1 ¼ ð1þ r ÞðY0 & CL0 Þ
Y0 ' wðT & ‘0Þ
AL1 þ wðT & ‘1Þ ¼ CL1 þ sL1
bL þ sL1 ð1þ r Þ & x ¼ CL2
if they work in period 1, and
AE1 ¼ ð1þ r ÞðY0 & CE0 Þ
Y0 ' wðT & ‘0Þ
AE1 þ bE ¼ CE1 þ sE1
bE þ sE1 ð1þ rÞ & x ¼ CE2
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if instead they opt for early retirement. In the above, A1 denotes assets that
are carried over from the previous period, s1is period 1 saving and x is the
shock that takes value F with probability p, 0 with probability (1 – p).
We further assume bE < bL, and consider the cases where early retire-
ment is actuarially fair
bE þ bE1þ r ¼
bL
1þ r
or, instead, early retirement is made financially attractive:
bE þ bE1þ r >
bL
1þ r :
In this model the decision to work in period 1 implies foregone leisure and
foregone pension bE, but allows consumers to change hours if adverse shocks
occur. Depending on the relative size of bE and bL, consumers may choose
to retire early, but find out later that they are in financial hardship because
of the shocks.
We solve the model for the case where utility takes the following form:
U ðC ; ‘Þ ' lnðCÞ þ a lnð‘Þ:
In this model, early retirement is never chosen in the actuarially fair case.
In fact, consumers can receive the same pension in present value terms
whether they retire in period 1 or in period 2, but can work in period 1
only if they retire in period 2. Early retirement is weakly dominated,
because it imposes an extra constraint on an otherwise identical optimiza-
tion problem.
Depending on the taste for leisure, early retirement can be made attrac-
tive ex-ante if its benefits are sufficiently large. In the calibrations of the
model we set period 0 labour income, Y0, equal to 100, the hourly wage
equal to 200 and we normalize T to 1. The shock variable, x, is taken to be
0.3Y0 with probability p = 0.5 and 0 otherwise. In the first case we analyse,
we assume the interest rate and the time preference parameter d to be 0.2,
we set a = 2.5 and make the late retirement benefits, bL, equal to 80% of
period 0 labour income, Y0. When early retirement is actuarially fair (see
panel a in Table 2), the late retirement option dominates the early retire-
ment option both in terms of ex-ante expected utility, and in terms of ex-post
variability in realized utility for the two possible outcomes of the shock (real-
ized utility is defined as life-time utility corresponding to the optimal values
of consumption and leisure, and the realized value of the shock variable, x.
Its variability is simply the difference between realized utility in the two
cases). We find that the consumer becomes indifferent ex-ante between early
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and late retirement if early retirement benefits are increased in such a way
that (for the given value of bL = 0.8Y0)
bE þ bE1:05 ¼
bL
1:05
:
In this case, ex-post life-time utility is more disperse where the consumer opts
for early retirement (as shown in panel b, utility ranges between 10.474 in
the zero shock case to 10.122 when the shock hits if the consumer retires
early; from 10.452 to 10.144 in the late retirement case).
When consumers have less taste for leisure, they opt for late retirement
(as shown in Table 2 for a = 1, see panel c). Consumers who enjoy leisure
more will instead take early retirement, even though they face low utility
when the shock hits (as shown in Table 2 for a = 3, panel d). Of course, the
choices made in the case of early retirement are unaffected by changes in a,
as shown in the last two columns of panels b, c and d.
Thus financially advantageous early retirement schemes lead to financial
hardship (low ex-post utility) for consumers hit by negative shocks. This hap-
pens despite the presence of precautionary savings in period 0, and of fur-
ther savings in period 1, simply because early retirees can no longer forego
leisure in period 1 to buffer the (by then) perfectly foreseen period 2 shock.
This situation can be taken to represent what happens (or used to happen
until a few years ago) in some Mediterranean and Central European coun-
tries.
In this model a first best solution can be achieved if a fair health insur-
ance scheme is introduced. The health shock we consider is best interpreted
as generating long-term care needs, that are typically well covered by the
government or private insurance schemes in Nordic and some Central Euro-
pean countries. In Southern European countries instead long-term care is
inadequately covered by the government, while private insurance policies
are not available for this type of health risk (Callegaro and Pasini, 2008). To
appraise the quantitative importance of long-term care, we can point to just
one indicator: in Sweden and the Netherlands almost 9% of 65+ individu-
als are in institutional care; this proportion is less than 4% in Italy and
Spain (see Table 2 in Bolin et al., 2008, for further details).
In the model consumers can only use one, low-return financial asset (if
periods are 20-year long, a 20% real return is what is normally obtained by
investing in short-term government debt or in saving accounts). Modelling
the availability of further financial assets is beyond the scope of this paper
(Bodie et al., 1992, analyse the household life-time portfolio choice when
stocks are risky; they show that flexibility in leisure choice is associated to
higher demand for stocks – in their model, leisure is used to insure the risk
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of low stock returns), but we can check what the consequences would be if a
higher-return asset was made available. We do this in panel e of Table 2,
where the interest rate is increased to 0.4, while the time preference param-
eter and early retirement pension benefits are as in the previous panels. We
can think of this as a case where stocks are made easily available to house-
holds. This has a positive wealth effect and therefore it makes early retire-
ment more attractive, because leisure is a normal good – we know that this
would not be the case if stock returns were risky (see Bodie et al., 1992).
However, given that early retirement is chosen, we see that stocks help
reduce the spread between ex-post utilities (the difference between realized
utilities with early retirement is just 0.276 compared to 0.352 of panel b – a
larger reduction, 0.076, than for late retirees, 0.052), that is, the availability
of a high-yielding asset reduces financial hardship for early retirees.
We argue that individuals who live in the first group of countries may find that
early retirement is a trap: it is financially advantageous ex ante, but shuts down the
possibility to buffer adverse shocks by increasing labour supply ex post. In the model
we present, individuals decide in their middle age whether to take early retirement
or not, and then find out if they are going to require long-term care in old age.
Other individual-specific shocks that would fit this framework are illness/disability
of a parent or the spouse at any time after the retirement decision is taken. A more
complex model would also contemplate economy-wide shocks, such as inflation on
goods that are particularly important for the elderly (such as medical goods and ser-
vices, or heating fuel, see Miniaci et al., 2008), that may be hedged by investment
in equity.
The question remains of why, in economies where financial and insurance mar-
kets do not operate well, pensions are typically more generous. A possible reason is
that in countries with incomplete markets governments have opted for paying
higher benefits to the retirees, in order to encourage informal risk-sharing arrange-
ments (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003).
It is worth stressing that early retirement as intended in the model does not nece-
ssarily match national definitions. Variability in the access to early retirement bene-
fits (and to old age benefits) is marked both across European countries and, within
each country, across types of employment and years. For example, in Italy the stat-
utory retirement age for women was 55 until recently and is now 60 (like in Aus-
tria), while in Sweden the old-age retirement age was 67 for a long time for both
men and women (it changed to 65 in 1995): Appendix B provides a summary of
these features for the relevant SHARE countries. Some countries had explicit early
retirement schemes only in some periods, while others allowed and still allow for
early retirement at very early ages (Italy). This variability in institutional set-ups is
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quite striking from the point of view of participation to the labour force which we
explore in this paper, as it turns out that in some countries the statutory retirement
age is (or was) so low that it is below the early retirement age in other countries,
hence making the concept of ‘early retirement’ hard to define in a clear and
consistent way.
What matters for this model is whether individuals are retired for a shorter or
longer period. This reflects preference heterogeneity (taste for leisure), differences in
Table 2. Numerical solutions of the theoretical model
Late retirement Early retirement
Shock No shock Shock No shock
(a) r = 0.2, bE = bL/2.2, a = 2.5
Eu0 10.298 10.228
C0 67.524 56.931
C1 64.763 70.532 50.918 64.554
‘1 0.810 0.882 1.000 1.000
C2 64.763 70.532 50.918 64.554
Ex-post utility 10.144 10.452 10.046 10.409
Difference 0.308 0.363
(b) r = 0.2, bE = bL/2.05, a = 2.5
Eu0 10.298 10.298
C0 67.524 58.552
C1 64.763 70.532 52.517 66.154
‘1 0.810 0.882 1.000 1.000
C2 64.763 70.532 52.517 66.154
Ex-post utility 10.144 10.452 10.122 10.474
Difference 0.308 0.352
(c) r = 0.2, bE = bL/2.05, a = 1.0
Eu0 10.808 10.298
C0 92.621 58.552
C1 88.419 97.243 52.517 66.154
‘1 0.442 0.486 1.000 1.000
C2 88.419 97.243 52.517 66.154
Ex-post utility 10.696 10.921 10.122 10.474
Difference 0.225 0.352
(d) r = 0.2, bE = bL/2.05, a = 3.0
Eu0 10.249 10.298
C0 61.930 58.552
C1 59.452 59.452 52.517 66.154
‘1 0.892 0.969 1.000 1.000
C2 59.452 64.624 52.517 66.154
Ex-post utility 10.081 10.417 10.122 10.474
Difference 0.336 0.352
(e) r = 0.4, bE = bL/2.05, a = 2.5
Eu0 10.401 10.486
C0 59.801 55.164
C1 67.383 72.328 59.040 70.729
‘1 0.842 0.904 1.000 1.000
C2 78.613 84.383 68.880 82.517
Ex-post utility 10.273 10.529 10.348 10.624
Difference 0.256 0.276
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life-time resources (the worse off cannot afford to retire early), as well as the implicit
tax rate of postponing retirement – as emphasized by Gruber and Wise (1999). In
estimation, we want to capture this last effect – to this end, we shall instrument
years into retirement with years into eligibility (as suggested in Battistin et al., 2008,
in their analysis of the retirement consumption drop in Italy). We shall come back
to this point when we describe our identification strategy.
To summarize, our model can be seen to predict the following:
a) where early retirement is made attractive and financial markets do not work
well, individuals who retire early are better off in the short run, but worse off
in the long run (that is: an increasing fraction of them will face financial hard-
ship) – this should be the case of countries like Italy and Austria;
b) where financial markets work well, and early retirement is not made attractive,
when people retire should not matter to their financial situation later in life –
this should be the case of countries like Denmark and Sweden;
c) in general, failure to use financial markets should increase the risk of facing finan-
cial hardship – also, the longer individuals have been retired for a given age, the
more likely they face financial hardship unless they can fully insure all risks.
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a unique
multidisciplinary and cross-national dataset that contains a large amount of
information on the physical and mental health, economic and social capital of
individuals aged 50 and over, and follows them over time (for an appraisal, see
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2005, 2008).
The SHARE data are well suited both to provide fresh evidence on the issues
highlighted above across a host of European countries (11 in the 2004 wave, 15 in
the 2006–7 wave), and to relate the observed pattern of unused labour capacity to
the financial situation of the early retirees, controlling for the role played by social
and family relations, as well as by welfare regimes. The evidence we present here is
based on an early release version of wave 2 SHARE data, and covers 10 countries
for which we could construct the required retirement eligibility variables (these are
the countries shown in all previous figures).
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the ‘early retirement trap’: the empirical
specification requires modelling the way financial hardship depends on unused
financial capacity and unused labour capacity, and how these two interact.
The SHARE survey contains a question that can be used to assess financial hard-
ship: a qualitative indicator of difficulty making ends meet. We treat households
who report difficulties as in financial hardship (or distress).
We construct indicators of unused financial capacity in two dimensions: limited diver-
sification across asset types (households are not well diversified, no stocks, if they do
not hold stocks directly or indirectly, including individual retirement accounts and
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occupational pensions), and failure to tap in home equity (for those homeowners
who have debts but no mortgage, debt but no mortgage). The former indicator is
defined for all households, the latter only for homeowners. We also construct indi-
cators of unused labour capacity, in the form of years elapsed from the retirement (for
retired people) and years to retirement (for workers) (years from retirement, years to retire-
ment). Given that we control for age, individuals with more years from retirement
are those who left the labour market earlier.
Our estimation strategy is the following: we estimate financial hardship equa-
tions, where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the household reports some
or great difficulties making ends meet, zero otherwise (financial hardship), as a func-
tion of a number of household and individual characteristics as well as variables
that capture household wealth, unused labour and financial capacity indicators.
The starting sample consists of all households who are either working or retired
(hence excluding other households out of work) in Denmark, Belgium, France, Aus-
tria, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Germany for a total of
11,496 observations. When we use the variable debt but no mortgage, we select home-
owners, and our sample is reduced to 8,313 observations.4
Throughout our analysis we condition on a set of explanatory variables, that
includes characteristics of the head (age and its square, sex, years of education,
self-reported health, mobility problems, fluency and recall ability), plus house-
hold-level variables (household size, and a couple dummy) and a set of country
dummies.
In the financial hardship equation, we also control for a few economic variables
– which we treat as potentially endogenous in estimation. These include wealth (the
sum of financial wealth and real wealth, net of debt and mortgages) and household
social security wealth. An individual’s social security wealth is the discounted value of
future benefits expected by the individual given the current legislation and given
longevity (for further details see Appendix B).
Our identification strategy rests on the following assumptions: we assume that
risk aversion and financial literacy are instruments for the unused financial capacity
indicators (no stocks, and debt but no mortgage where applicable). We take the number of
rooms in the main residence as an instrument for wealth (that is, the sum of financial
and real assets, net of liabilities), on the assumption that the main residence is cho-
sen earlier in life and is not easily changed in response to shocks. Retirement status
of the head (retired) is instrumented by a job-pension eligibility variable that we con-
struct by taking into account country-specific early retirement legislation by occupa-
tion, gender, year of retirement and potential years of contributions. Similarly,
years from/to retirement are instrumented by years to/from eligibility (job-pension
eligibility is further described in Appendix B, where it is shown how and to what
4 We classify individuals by their employment status as either employed (either employee or self-employed) or retired (that
includes all those who report themselves as retired from work, but for those who currently do some paid work).
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extent eligibility varies within countries). Household social security wealth, that is based
on actual or expected retirement age, is instrumented by a potential social security
wealth variable, that is based on legal retirement age (further details on how these
two variables were calculated are also provided in Appendix A). Institutional differ-
ences across countries and groups of individuals are thus exploited to construct a
set of instruments for retirement-related explanatory variables, following the sugges-
tions made by the unused labour capacity literature discussed above.
Given that financial hardship is a dichotomous variable, and so also are the
unused financial capacity indicators, taking into account the endogeneity of these
indicators requires estimating a seemingly unrelated system of probit equations for
financial hardship, no stocks and debt but no mortgage, where the last two equations
include as additional instruments indicators of risk aversion (low risk aversion and med-
ium risk aversion) of likely proximity to banks (rural), and of financial literacy (this is
summarized in the ability to calculate percentages, percentage calculation, to divide a
number by a ratio, lottery division, and to calculate compound interest rates, compound
interest). The wealth and unused labour capacity variables that enter the first
equation are also potentially endogenous, but continuous, and instrumental
variables estimates can be computed by adding to the equation the residuals from
the first stage.
In Table 3 we present estimation results for the whole sample that includes
homeowners and tenants. Therefore, the only indicator of unused financial capacity
is no stocks. In column (1) we show how the probability of financial hardship is
affected by not having stocks for all households (no stocks) and by the number of
years elapsed since retirement (years from retirement), controlling for age and demo-
graphic variables, but also for economic variables that relate to wealth. Our
theoretical model predicts that risky assets should lower the probability of financial
hardship, while years from retirement should increase it (at least after a sufficiently
long time interval, if early retirement is financially advantageous).
In estimation, years from retirement (and its square), wealth and social security
wealth are treated as endogenous and instrumented, by adding the first stage resid-
ual to the regression. Also treated as endogenous is the no stocks dummy variable –
this is jointly estimated in a bivariate probit system (parameter estimates are
reported in column 2). Other variables (years to retirement and its square, and
retired) are instead treated as exogenous, following the results of a Hausman test (see
column 1 in Table A1 of the Appendix).5
5 The inclusion of several binary endogenous variables in probit-style equations leads to non-trivial computational problems,
but a Hausman-style test is easily conducted by introducing in the regression the residuals from the first stage equations for
all possibly endogenous variables (see for instance Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 472–8), whether discrete or continuous. In our case,
these first stage regressions are all well determined – the only feature worth reporting is that wealth is heavily affected both
by number of rooms in the main residence and by the risk aversion indicators, and the latter play a key role in explaining
the probability of having risky assets. The probability of not having stocks is also explained by financial literacy, but the com-
mon dependency of wealth and no stocks on the risk aversion indicators results in less precise estimates of the coefficient of the
latter variable in the financial hardship equation.
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Table 3. Explaining the probability of financial hardship – all countries
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial hardship No stocks Financial
hardship
Prob (no
stocks) < 0.5
Financial
hardship
Prob (no
stocks) > 0.5
No stocks 0.2414*
(0.1385)
Years from retirement 0.0127 0.0795 )0.0420
(0.0250) (0.1617) (0.0269)
(Years from retirement)2 0.0021** )0.0011 0.0036***
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Wealth )0.0014*** )0.0012*** )0.0020***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Social security wealth )0.0007*** )0.0015*** )0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Retired 0.0887 0.5596*** 0.0124 0.0636
(0.1627) (0.0822) (0.8708) (0.2227)
Years to retirement )0.0020 )0.0083 0.0036 0.0134
(0.0252) (0.0225) (0.0498) (0.0455)
(Years to retirement)2 )0.0001 )0.0012 )0.0012 0.0033
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0030)
Age 0.2324*** )0.0758** )0.0150 0.3467***
(0.0848) (0.0345) (0.3920) (0.1261)
Age2 )0.0022*** 0.0006*** )0.0003 )0.0029***
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0035) (0.0011)
Male 0.0726** )0.0206 )0.0915* 0.1411***
(0.0341) (0.0335) (0.0535) (0.0496)
Couple )0.0294 )0.2398*** )0.0605 )0.0112
(0.0352) (0.0340) (0.0692) (0.0436)
Household size 0.0941*** 0.0338* 0.1023*** 0.0778***
(0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0278) (0.0266)
Years of education )0.0137*** )0.0366*** 0.0154* )0.0305***
(0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0079) (0.0070)
Bad health 0.0895** 0.0706* 0.2714*** 0.0325
(0.0400) (0.0368) (0.0968) (0.0522)
Mobility indicator 0.0592 0.1179*** )0.0716 0.1256**
(0.0445) (0.0436) (0.0982) (0.0511)
# Chronic diseases 0.0723*** )0.0169 0.0871*** 0.0616***
(0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0215) (0.0130)
Fluency )0.0035 )0.0117*** )0.0058 0.0008
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0033)
Recall )0.0179* )0.0364*** )0.0155 )0.0121
(0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0167) (0.0127)
Home-owner )0.0315 )0.1584*** )0.1593** 0.1750*
(0.0556) (0.0357) (0.0753) (0.0991)
Percentage calculation )0.0812*
(0.0444)
Lottery division )0.0106
(0.0467)
Compound interest )0.0119
(0.0546)
Low risk aversion )0.8472***
(0.0681)
Continued
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Several demographic explanatory variables have significant coefficients in column
(1), most notably education of head, age, health and mobility problems indicators.
Country dummies also have significant coefficients, that we shall discuss later (see
Table 4). Among the economic variables, wealth and social security wealth have
strong, negative effects; years from retirement has a positive, jointly significant effect,
whereas no stocks has a positive, but only marginally significant, impact on the prob-
ability of financial hardship. The first stage regression for no stocks produces signifi-
cant coefficients on many covariates that also affect financial hardship, but also on
the risk aversion variables. Notably, financial literacy variables play little role in this
equation.
These estimates show that the failure to diversify the portfolio does increase the
probability of financial hardship, as expected. They also show that financial hard-
ship is more likely if the head is retired compared to employed.
We can work out the implications of our point estimates by computing the mar-
ginal effects on the hardship probability of years from retirement for a given age.
In Figure 7 we present the marginal effects for a male, living in a couple, retired –
the other variables are at their means at ages 60 and age 80.
Table 3. Continued
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial hardship No stocks Financial
hardship
Prob (no
stocks) < 0.5
Financial
hardship
Prob (no
stocks) > 0.5
Medium risk aversion )0.7831***
(0.0374)
Rural )0.1127
(0.0938)
Number of rooms )0.0772***
(0.0125)
(Number of rooms)*rural 0.0545***
(0.0196)
Social security wealth (legal) )0.0000
(0.0001)
Years from eligibility 0.0378***
(0.0106)
(Years from eligibility)2 )0.0010***
(0.0002)
Constant )6.5162*** 3.8022*** 1.3616 )10.0386***
(2.4269) (1.2425) (10.7174) (3.6086)
Observations 11496 11496 5131 6378
P-value: zero coefficients
on years from retirement
and (years from retire-
ment)2
0.0387 0.7425 0.0121
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1). All specifications include a set of
country dummies.
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The solid line represents the probability of financial hardship for someone who is
today 80 years of age as a function of their age of retirement (long-run effect). It is
computed for a male living in a couple and at the sample means of all other
explanatory variables in Table 3, using point estimates of all parameters. This func-
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Figure 7. Marginal effects of retirement age on financial hardship – all
countries
Table 4. Country effects on financial hardship in different specifications
Coefficient No controls Standard set of controls Unused capacity controls
(1) (2) (3)
Denmark 0.1212 0.1089 0.1712
(0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0231)
Belgium 0.2847 0.3027 0.2641
(0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0165)
France 0.3432 0.3869 0.3603
(0.0127) (0.0149) (0.0169)
Austria 0.2316 0.1528 0.0836
(0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0182)
Spain 0.5210 0.4952 0.4197
(0.0184) (0.0213) (0.0308)
Italy 0.6017 0.5107 0.3593
(0.0140) (0.0172) (0.0411)
Netherlands 0.1562 0.1306 0.1655
(0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0172)
Sweden 0.1763 0.1390 0.2150
(0.0100) (0.0096) (0.0251)
Switzerland 0.1594 0.2166 0.2476
(0.0127) (0.0178) (0.0228)
Germany 0.2408 0.1739 0.1699
(0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0129)
Mean 0.2836 0.2617 0.2456
Variance 0.0263 0.0234 0.0113
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tion decreases with retirement age: the longer a person of that generation has been
retired, the more likely that person is in financial hardship. For this generation,
early retirement increases the probability of current financial hardship. The dashed
line shows the same probability for someone who is currently 60 years of age
(short-run effect). Also for this group, retiring at young ages increases the probabil-
ity of financial hardship, but the curve is less steep: early retirement is less harmful
in the short run than in the long run. The relative position of the two lines is not
necessarily meaningful, because they refer to different generations.
We can also split the sample according to the probability of having stocks:
column 3 presents estimates for the 5,131 households whose estimated probability
of owning stocks is greater than half, column 4 refers instead to the other half of
the sample (6,378), who are more at risk of suffering as a result of early retirement.
As expected, the effects of years from retirement are much stronger for individuals
belonging to this latter group (the p-value of the joint test is reported at the bottom
of the table), even though the sign of the linear coefficient turns negative, implying
that early retirement is good in the short run. The strongly positive coefficient on
the squared term implies that early retirement has bad effects in the long run, that
is, it eventually increases the probability of financial hardship.
An interesting exercise is to look at how far cross-country differences in financial
hardship can be explained by unused financial and labour capacity. To this end we
present in Table 4 the probabilities implied by estimated parameters of country
dummies for three different specifications: in column (1) there are absolutely no
controls in the probit equation (so the estimates predict the average probabilities),
in column (2) all the demographic and economic controls used in Table 3 are in
the specification, but for the financial capacity (no stocks) and labour capacity (retire-
ment, years from retirement, years to retirement) variables. Column (3) instead corresponds
to column (1) of Table 3. Unlike Table 3, there is no baseline country – all other
explanatory variables are expressed in deviations from their sample means.
A comparison between columns (1) and (2) suggests that in some countries house-
hold size and composition, age, health, education and wealth make little difference
to the average probability of financial hardship. Overall, the average of the country
effects is slightly smaller, but their variance is almost identical.
A much clearer picture emerges from comparing columns (2) and (3): adding
financial and labour capacity variables further reduces average effects, but much
more importantly more than halves their variance. This implies that unused finan-
cial and labour capacity indicators play a key role in explaining why financial hard-
ship differs so much across European countries, as shown in column (7) of Table 1.
The remarkable decrease in the variability of country dummy coefficients when
unused capacity indicators are introduced in the regressions strongly supports the
importance of these factors in explaining financial hardship patterns across countries.
However, the fact that some variability remains is worth noticing. This may simply
reflect differences in reporting styles, with individuals in Latin countries being more
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prone to report difficulties compared to individuals in Sweden, Denmark, Germany
and the Netherlands. Also, some differences may indeed relate to the noted lack of
long-term care coverage in Southern European countries – a factor that is only partly
captured by the unused financial capacity proxies used in our regression.
We have run some robustness checks on the basic specification reported in
Table 3. First of all, we considered the possibility that wealth does not fully capture
the role of precautionary savings – and therefore allowed risk aversion to have a
direct impact on financial hardship. While the coefficient for medium risk-aversion
was significant, the pattern of estimated coefficients did not conform to expecta-
tions, and the coefficients on the key unused labour capacity variables were qualita-
tively unaffected. Also, we tried to use financial literacy variables as an indicator of
unused financial capacity, rather than the no stock indicator. Again, the unused
labour capacity coefficients were unaffected. Estimated financial literacy coefficients
suggested that all relevant variability lies in the first indicator (percentage calculation),
that was marginally significant in the financial hardship equation, but splitting the
sample according to it did not produce significantly different coefficients on the
variables of interest.
Overall, we can interpret the estimates shown in Tables 3 and 4 as evidence that
both unused financial capacity and unused labour capacity contribute to financial
hardship. These estimates support the claim that early retirement can be a trap:
workers who were induced to take early retirement by the financial incentives built
into the public pensions systems are now more likely to find themselves in financial
hardship.
In Table 5 we present estimates of financial hardship probabilities for the sub-
sample of home-owners, as this allows us to add the other financial capacity indica-
tor to the system of equations, that is, the presence of unsecured debt without a
mortgage. As stressed above, this likely indicates that households pay more interest
than necessary, and may either point to their financial illiteracy or to high transac-
tion costs on mortgages. In this exercise, we treat as endogenous the same variables
as in Table 3 (Hausman test results are reported in Table A1), plus of course the
debt but no mortgage indicator.
We see that both indicators of unused financial capacity have strong effects on
financial hardship, with the predicted signs – the quadratic polynomial in years from
retirement also has jointly highly significant coefficients (the p-value of the F-test is less
than 1%), but qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 3.
The theoretical model sketched in Section 2.3 suggests that in some countries early
retirement should be advantageous in the short run, but detrimental in the long run
– these are the countries that allow individuals to retire early (in their fifties) without
a suitable reduction in their retirement income. In some other countries, instead,
early retirement is actuarially neutral, or even not allowed at all (in which case, other
forms of income support are in place for those individuals who lose their jobs in their
fifties, or are hit by adverse health shocks that limit their working ability).
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Table 5. Explaining the probability of financial hardship for homeowners – all
countries
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Financial hardship No stocks Debt but no mortgage
No stocks 0.3793***
(0.0661)
Debt but no mortgage 0.3643***
(0.1177)
Years from retirement 0.0355
(0.0282)
(Years from retirement)2 0.0038***
(0.0013)
Wealth )0.0010***
(0.0001)
Social security wealth )0.0009***
(0.0001)
Retired )0.1176 0.5454*** 0.1016
(0.1851) (0.0961) (0.1156)
Years to retirement 0.0003 )0.0079 )0.0162
(0.0300) (0.0263) (0.0318)
(Years to retirement)2 )0.0004 )0.0006 )0.0017
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0021)
Age 0.4455*** )0.0431 0.0412
(0.1288) (0.0421) (0.0525)
Age2 )0.0040*** 0.0004 )0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Male 0.1058*** )0.0509 0.0799
(0.0410) (0.0396) (0.0514)
Couple 0.0227 )0.2687*** 0.0251
(0.0411) (0.0392) (0.0507)
Household size 0.1052*** 0.0508** 0.0574**
(0.0223) (0.0235) (0.0278)
Years of education )0.0187*** )0.0397*** )0.0077
(0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0069)
Bad health 0.0494 0.0620 )0.0362
(0.0513) (0.0446) (0.0581)
Mobility indicator 0.0222 0.0663 0.0246
(0.0624) (0.0533) (0.0684)
# Chronic diseases 0.0604*** )0.0106 0.0551***
(0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0182)
Fluency )0.0050* )0.0109*** 0.0106***
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0036)
Recall )0.0021 )0.0364*** )0.0109
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0159)
Percentage calculation )0.1082** )0.0153
(0.0543) (0.0670)
Lottery division )0.0323 )0.1023
(0.0563) (0.0723)
Compound interest )0.0247 )0.1629*
(0.0650) (0.0868)
Low risk aversion )0.9003*** )0.0454
(0.0793) (0.0883)
Medium risk aversion )0.7758*** )0.0285
(0.0425) (0.0583)
Continued
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It therefore makes sense to estimate separate financial hardship equations for
groups of countries that are relatively homogenous in the way they treat early
retirees. Small sample sizes unfortunately prevent us from estimating these
equations country by country.
In what follows, we split the sample between generous early retirement countries
and ‘actuarially fair’ countries. Belgium, France and Italy were found to be
‘generous’ in Gruber and Wise (1999) – Austria was not considered in that study,
but Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta (1998) show its early retirement provisions to be quite
similar. Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland do not favour early retirement accord-
ing to Gruber and Wise (1999), and we therefore classify them together. We do not
include the Netherlands among the group of more generous countries, despite the
large number of individuals who take up disability insurance as a pathway to retire-
ment, because we are forced to exclude from the analysis precisely those individu-
als, for whom we cannot compute the key unused labour capacity variables (years
from retirement and years from eligibility variables).
In column (1) of Table 6 we report estimates of financial hardship (and not
having stocks) equations for the former group of countries, in column (3) we do
likewise for the latter group. Notably, we find that the key estimated coefficients on
the years from retirement quadratic polynomial are highly significant in Austria,
Belgium, France and Italy, while they are not at all significant in Denmark, Sweden
and Switzerland. The coefficient on no stocks has a positive sign in both cases, but
in both cases it is also insignificant. This is probably due to the reduced sample
sizes (4,760 households in the first group of countries, 3,658 in the second), together
Table 5. Continued
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Financial hardship No stocks Debt but no mortgage
Rural )0.0780 )0.0840
(0.1137) (0.1401)
Number of rooms )0.0725*** )0.0135
(0.0142) (0.0187)
(Number of rooms)*rural 0.0500** 0.0353
(0.0227) (0.0282)
Social security wealth (legal) 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Years from eligibility 0.0268** )0.0123
(0.0125) (0.0149)
(Years from eligibility)2 )0.0006** 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant )12.9189*** 2.4761* )2.5665
(3.7219) (1.5006) (1.8404)
Observations 8313 8313 8313
P-value: zero coefficients on
years from retirement and
(years from retirement)2
0.0034
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1).
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with the extremely low prevalence of risky assets ownership among the retired in
‘generous early retirement’ countries.
Notably, for those countries where early retirement is made attractive we find the
same pattern of coefficients on the retirement quadratic polynomial as was found
for individuals with low probability of holding risky financial assets in all countries
(see column (4) of Table 3): the linear term has a negative coefficient, the quadratic
instead has a positive coefficient. This implies that financial hardship is less likely
for early retirees in the first years of retirement, it becomes more likely later (when
negative shocks are realized), in line with our theoretical model predictions.
In Figure 8 we plot the probability of financial hardship as a function of retire-
ment age for two individuals, aged 60 and 80 respectively, who live in countries
with generous early retirement schemes. Retirement age is assumed to be between
50 and 70 years of age. The solid line represents the probability of financial hard-
ship for someone who is today 80 years of age as a function of their retirement age
(long-run effect). It is computed for a male living in a couple and at the sample
means of all other explanatory variables of column (1) in Table 6, using point esti-
mates of all parameters. This function decreases with retirement age: the longer a
person of that generation has been retired, the more likely that person is now in
financial hardship. For this generation, early retirement increases the probability of
current financial hardship, as was found for all countries. The dashed line shows
the same probability for someone who is currently 60 years of age (short-run effect).
For this group, retiring at young ages decreases the probability of financial hard-
ship: early retirement is advantageous in the short run, because of the generous
early retirement schemes in place in this group of countries (as negative shocks have
not yet been realized). Here again, the relative position of the two lines is not
necessarily meaningful, because they refer to different generations.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper we have used SHARE data on almost 12,000 households living in 10
European countries who were interviewed in 2006–2007. These countries differ in
their pension and welfare systems, in prevailing retirement age and in households’
access to financial markets. We have addressed the issue of how early retirement
(‘unused labour capacity’) may interact with limited use of financial markets (‘unused
financial capacity’) in producing financial hardship late in life. This interaction we
have labelled the ‘early retirement trap’. We have shown evidence that the early retire-
ment trap operates, particularly in some Southern and Central European countries.
Increasing the labour force participation of older individuals has long been a
major objective of the EU: the Lisbon Treaty has set very specific targets to be
reached by the year 2010 specifically on these measures. To date, some countries
are quite far from the target levels of labour force participation and there is sub-
stantial unused labour capacity among the young old (individuals aged 50–64).
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Table 6. Explaining the probability of financial hardship, countries with gen-
erous early retirement schemes (Austria, Belgium, France and Italy) and with-
out generous early retirement schemes (Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial hardship No stocks Financial hardship No stocks
AT, BE, FR and IT DK, SE and CH
No stocks )0.0113 0.1706
(0.2296) (0.2472)
Years from retirement )0.2539*** 0.0860
(0.0550) (0.0734)
(Years from retirement)2 0.0107*** )0.0017
(0.0027) (0.0012)
Wealth )0.0019*** )0.0007***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Social security wealth )0.0004*** )0.0015***
(0.0001) (0.0004)
Retired 1.4186*** 0.5939*** 0.0819 0.5803***
(0.2773) (0.1189) (0.3964) (0.1654)
Years to retirement )0.1679*** )0.0791** 0.0287 0.0614
(0.0409) (0.0361) (0.0501) (0.0462)
(Years to retirement)2 )0.0064** )0.0040 0.0004 0.0034
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0030)
Age 0.8187*** 0.0395 )0.0378 )0.0108
(0.1998) (0.0509) (0.0800) (0.1266)
Age2 )0.0063*** )0.0002 )0.0002 0.0001
(0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Male 0.1690*** )0.0462 )0.0865 0.0823
(0.0587) (0.0507) (0.0670) (0.0660)
Couple )0.0841* )0.1632*** 0.0217 )0.1492**
(0.0497) (0.0528) (0.0776) (0.0708)
Household size 0.1274*** 0.0243 )0.0661 )0.0495
(0.0269) (0.0299) (0.0475) (0.0502)
Years of education )0.0271*** )0.0380*** 0.0125 )0.0299***
(0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0076)
Bad health 0.0017 0.1171** 0.1891** 0.0514
(0.0577) (0.0568) (0.0738) (0.0672)
Mobility indicator 0.0604 0.1274* 0.0990 0.0988
(0.0570) (0.0663) (0.0791) (0.0770)
# Chronic diseases 0.0714*** )0.0370** 0.0951*** 0.0268
(0.0164) (0.0188) (0.0207) (0.0197)
Fluency )0.0060 )0.0090** )0.0074 )0.0132***
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0047)
Recall )0.0129 )0.0512*** )0.0216 )0.0353*
(0.0145) (0.0159) (0.0196) (0.0192)
Home-owner 0.1424 )0.1648*** )0.2350*** )0.1499**
(0.0983) (0.0585) (0.0754) (0.0637)
France 0.3333*** )0.3456***
(0.0619) (0.0549)
Austria )0.5466*** 0.5847***
(0.0857) (0.0802)
Italy 0.3969*** 0.6679***
(0.0903) (0.0947)
Denmark )0.2935*** )0.2534***
(0.0998) (0.0776)
Continued
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The issue of unused financial capacity is instead relatively new to policy-makers.
We have documented that in some European countries mature individuals do not
invest in the stock market directly or indirectly, and fail to release the available
home equity while borrowing at much higher rates. This is partly due to the pres-
ence of pecuniary transaction costs, partly to the lack of knowledge on financial
markets and instruments, and has far reaching policy implications, which also relate
to the issue of retirement.
From a financial standpoint early retirement is a missed diversification opportu-
nity, and should not be promoted at least for those individuals whose wealth is
poorly diversified (it is mostly held in housing and human capital).
We have shown that the probability of being in financial hardship relates to indica-
tors of unused financial capacity – even after taking into account the possible role
played by reverse causality and controlling for other factors that may explain financial
Table 6. Continued
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial hardship No stocks Financial hardship No stocks
AT, BE, FR and IT DK, SE and CH
Sweden )0.0854 )0.6981***
(0.1056) (0.0818)
Percentage calculation 0.0226 )0.0968
(0.0658) (0.0800)
Lottery division 0.1065 )0.0889
(0.0707) (0.0835)
Compound interest 0.0725 )0.1385
(0.0881) (0.0980)
Low risk aversion )0.9467*** )0.7140***
(0.1225) (0.0985)
Medium risk aversion )0.9355*** )0.5434***
(0.0552) (0.0756)
Rural )0.2166 )0.0213
(0.1380) (0.1743)
Number of rooms )0.0745*** )0.1011***
(0.0177) (0.0254)
(Number of rooms)*rural 0.0753*** 0.0451
(0.0285) (0.0379)
Social security wealth (legal) 0.0000 )0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Years from eligibility 0.0105 0.0261
(0.0140) (0.0302)
(Years from eligibility)2 )0.0001 )0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0010)
Constant )26.2353*** )0.4514 2.6175 1.2056
(6.2556) (1.7882) (2.6260) (4.4146)
Observations 4760 4760 3658 3658
P-value: zero coefficients on
years from retirement and
(years from retirement)2
0.0000 0.3889
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1).
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hardship (health, age, family size, and even wealth and retirement status). Financial
hardship also relates to unused labour capacity, and more so for those individuals
who do not use financial markets and in those countries where early retirement is
encouraged. In particular, we find that those individuals who retired earlier are –
other things being equal (including age, health and wealth) – more likely to be in
financial hardship than those who retired later. In countries where early retirement is
financially attractive, this effect does not take place immediately, but is then stronger
in old age. This we take to be evidence of the operation of an early retirement trap.
A policy implication of the presence of the early retirement trap is that – in line
with the EU directives – social security and pension systems should become less
generous in those European countries where retirement is still common at relatively
younger ages, thus increasing effective retirement age and reducing the risk of
future financial distress for those who are currently working.
An even more pressing policy implication of the early retirement trap is that
retirement should be made less of an absorbing state – if currently retired individu-
als were allowed to take up jobs without losing their pension, and with no social
stigma, financial distress could be abated via labour market participation.
On the financial side, inducing better use of financial and debt instruments can
reduce financial distress. Given the likely importance of transaction costs in deter-
mining the inefficient management of financial and real assets, we advocate policies
that promote competition across financial institutions. To the extent that financial
literacy is a factor behind unused financial capacity, then the dissemination of easy-
to-use, independent financial information is another policy recommendation, partic-
ularly for elderly individuals.
Finally, our model has emphasized that an important role in generating financial
distress is played by long-term health risks, that may be revealed to individuals
early on, but become a financial burden later in life. While second-best solutions
Countries with generous early retirement schemes
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are savings and prolonged labour activity, the first-best solution to this type of risk
would of course be long-term care insurance. If market failures prevent private
insurance companies from offering attractive long-term care contracts, then direct
public provision may be necessary.
Our policy conclusions should not be seen as alternatives. In fact, governments
could use the money saved on public pensions by raising the retirement age, and
the extra tax revenue obtained through the return to work by retirees to provide
long-term care insurance.
Discussion
Jean Olivier Hairault
University Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics
Ageing jeopardizes the sustainability of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) systems. Faced with
this changing demographic trend, most developed countries have chosen to encour-
age the elderly to delay retirement by rewarding a longer working life with more
actuarially fair pensions. Such a strategy is weakened by the fact that a significant
proportion of older workers are actually unemployed or entitled to specific assistance
programmes long before the current age at which benefits are first available.
Beside the financial sustainability of PAYG, a low employment rate means more
fundamentally unused labour capacity. A very large fraction of individuals aged
55–64 are not employed in most countries, although there are large differences
across countries. Whereas Sweden and Denmark have more than 60% of their pop-
ulation at work, the employment rate is below 40% in Belgium, Italy and France
(Table 7). Countries where the older worker’s employment is particularly low are
enticed by the Lisbon agenda to improve their performances.
Along the lines of Gruber and Wise (1999) and Blo¨ndal and Scarpetta (1998),
Angelini, Brugiavini and Weber’s paper interprets the existence of unused labour
capacity as the result of misleading policies: there are strong financial incentives
Table 7. Employment rate statistics (2006, OECD)
55)64 55)59 60)64
Belgium 30.4 42.1 15.5
Denmark 60.9 79.7 41.1
France 40.4 56.5 17.4
Germany 48.5 64.5 30.1
Italy 32.4 43.9 18.5
Netherlands 46.9 63.1 26.1
Spain 44.1 53.9 32.9
Sweden 69.7 79.5 59.5
United Kingdom 57.3 69.1 43.1
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provided by the public pension system rules to retire early in some countries. Ange-
lini, Brugiavini and Weber do not bring any new empirical elements in favour of
this thesis, but they add a new argument in favour of reducing the unused capacity
of older workers. Namely, early retired people are more exposed to financial hard-
ship in their older years than those who retire later. Postponing retirement would
allow older workers to offset negative shocks when financial and insurance markets
are incomplete. As the generosity of early retirement incentives makes older work-
ers less sensitive to the option value of postponing retirement, some countries create
early retirement traps in the sense that individuals who retired early are more likely
to be in financial hardship.
This paper addresses an important question and provides interesting results,
which challenge the early retirement strategy in an original way. Unused labour
and financial capacities interact to explain the probability of being in financial dis-
tress. The policy recommendation is then straightforward: early retirement should
be made less attractive.
The validity of this policy recommendation relies on two key features. First, early
retirement is policy-driven. Secondly, early retirement induces some fragility against
shocks. I discuss in turn these two points.
What causes early retirement?
Angelini, Brugiavini and Weber start by illustrating the unused labour capacity for
older workers in some European countries. They claim that the cross-country differ-
ences in the employment rate of older workers reflect mainly the existence of strong
incentives to retire earlier in some countries due to institutional policies. They do
not propose any new empirical evidence supporting this view.
However, the reasons for the low employment of the older workers are highly
debated. One often alleged reason is that technical progress makes older workers
less employable. It is, however, a controversial issue. Technological and organiza-
tional innovations may be beneficial to older workers because they are more skilled
and experienced. On the other hand, innovation accelerates skill obsolescence and
requires adaptability. Whereas Borghans and Ter Weel (2002) and Friedberg (2003)
find no significant impact of technical changes on older workers’ employment,
Aubert et al. (2006) observe such an influence and emphasize both organizational
and technological changes.
These labour demand-driven causes are certainly important to explain the
decrease in the employment rate for older workers, especially in particular sectors
which are more exposed to technological changes. But it is difficult to explain the
large differences we observe across countries on this basis, as it has never been
shown that some countries are more immune from the technological changes. This
is why I agree with the thesis favoured by Angelini, Brugiavini and Weber in their
paper. In Table 7, we indeed observe that the main cross-country differences
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concern the 60–65 age bracket. This actually reflects the differences in the normal
retirement age, which is equal to 60 in France, Italy and Belgium, whereas it
reaches 65 in Sweden and Denmark for instance. We also observe some differences
before 60. In a recent paper, Hairault et al. (2009) show that the proximity to the
retirement age strongly perturbs the employment rate of older workers: the sooner
the retirement age, the lower the employment of older workers before 60. To the
extent that there are search frictions on the labour market, the return on jobs is
determined by their expected duration: the time to retirement is then key to under-
standing older workers’ employment.
Overall, these facts reinforce the view defended in Angelini, Brugiavini and
Weber’s paper that the retirement policies are responsible for the employment rate
of older workers, even before the normal retirement age and besides the normal
impact of generous insurance schemes.
The consequences of early retirement
Angelini, Brugiavini and Weber see early retirement as a cause of financial hardship
when people get older. They propose to test whether financial hardship depends on
unused financial capacity and on unused labour capacity. In particular, unused labour
capacity is measured in the form of years elapsed from retirement, as, for a given age,
individuals with more years from retirement are those who left the labour market earlier.
They first propose a streamlined theoretical model in order to present some key ele-
ments of causality. One of them is the incompleteness of financial and insurance
markets. In these circumstances, postponing retirement provides an option value in
an uncertain environment. Early retirement does not allow older workers to cope with
negative shocks. This is particularly true in countries where agents do not use financial
assets to smooth their consumption. More precisely, the model is a three-period one:
in the first period, agents decide whether to take early or late retirement in the second
period. In the third period the shock becomes effective and all workers are retired.
However, in the second period all the agents observe the shock which will affect them
in their last period of life. They can react to it by supplying more hours if and only if
they have decided in the first period to stay at work. An important feature of the
model is that agents have information on the shocks during the intermediate period
(let us say between 55 and 65). Otherwise they would react by precautionary savings
whatever their situation on the labour market.
The timing of these shocks is crucial: if early retirement makes a strong differ-
ence as compared to working later, this concerns a short interval, between 55 and
65. Are illness and disability of a parent so frequent at these ages? The evidence is
rather that these shocks are much more frequent after 70. We would need a more
precise empirical identification of the kind of shocks considered as crucial by the
authors. What exactly are these shocks that can be smoothed by working longer?
Are these shocks strong and frequent enough to induce severe financial hardship
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for early retired individuals? It is particularly important to pay more attention to
these shocks, as well-identified shocks hitting older workers between 55 and 65,
namely unemployment shocks, lead to an opposite conclusion: working more years
is not an available solution.
In terms of empirical analysis, there is a potential risk of misinterpreting the facts
due to a classic problem of reverse causation: the higher the probability of financial
hardship, the higher the probability of early retirement. Unemployed individuals
without any perspectives to find a new job (their job finding rate is particularly low)
may be liquidity constrained (financial hardship) and so may find the early retire-
ment option preferable. This is why years from retirement are instrumented by
years from eligibility in Angelini, Brugiavini and Weber’s paper.
However, I think that their instrument may lead to elimination of a lot of the indi-
vidual source of heterogeneity in the data. Years from retirement are instrumented
by years from eligibility that the authors construct by taking into account country-
specific early retirement legislation by occupation and gender and potential years of
contributions. But then, what is the individual heterogeneity inside countries that is
left in the data? More descriptive statistics on that point are needed. One can suspect
that the heterogeneity relies too much on country differences, then losing an impor-
tant part of the individual dimension. I believe that more precise information on the
computation of the distance from eligibility should have been given in the Appendix,
and more descriptive statistics on this variable as well, especially a measure of the
heterogeneity across individuals of the same country.
Why are French, Italian, Austrian and Belgian older workers more often in
financial hardship? Because of early retirement? Or due to other country-specific
factors not included, like the degree of inequality for instance (poor people may be
particularly poor in the first group of countries)? Is financial hardship specific to
older workers or is the whole population characterized by a higher probability of
financial hardship? No comparison with other age groups has been made due to
the data considered. It could have been interesting to provide a comparison with
other age groups in order to assess the specificity of the older worker’s case.
Overall, an alternative strategy would have been to rely on a country-specific
experience: using a reform which has introduced an early retirement scheme for a
given group (particular sector or skill) and estimating the change in the probability
of financial hardship versus a control group.
Besides the problem of identification, the cross-country approach chosen by the
authors requires a comprehensive understanding and knowledge of each of the
national Social Security systems, which are really specific and difficult to compare
using the same variables. I am not sure that the Italian Social System is so specific
that it justifies the much longer description which is devoted to it compared to
other countries. This may reveal that the authors have much more information on
their national system than on the others. This reflects the difficulty of adopting a
cross-country approach to the Social Security issue.
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Even though it is a difficult task to test the influence of early retirement on finan-
cial hardship of older workers, this paper is a successful attempt to provide some
first empirical evidence. There is no doubt that it will help to stimulate further
research on this important issue.
Panel discussion
Pierre-Yves Geoffard wondered why the authors did not use health indicators to
instrument the retirement decision, and whether they have any information about
the pre-retirement financial situation. Morten Ravn added that any model of retire-
ment has to feature that health is changing with age. He also noticed that looking
at ex post financial hardship can be misleading, since ex ante the decision might well
have been optimal. Andrea Bassanini remarked that the relevant shocks have to be
unrelated to the retirement decision; if your job is dangerous, retiring reduces death
risk in ways that do not show up in the regressions. He also noticed that stock own-
ership seems more relevant for rich people, not for those who end up in financial
hardship. Moreover, the level of financial literacy required is higher nowadays than
in the 1970s, and may be much beyond what can be provided in the system. In
the case of Denmark, as Christian Shulz noticed, it is not really a matter of
improving financial literacy: indeed, stock ownership comes from union-managed
mutual funds. According to Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, the authors should also
account for the individual expected length of life at retirement; life expectancy
likely differs across individuals, and may explain the decision to retire early and the
likelihood of financial hardship. She also asked why the authors did not control for
the possibility that the ‘difficulty with making ends meet’ differs by country, culture
and similar features. On the financial variables of interest, Tito Boeri expressed
concerns about the financial hardship question in the SHARE survey, which is very
subjective.
APPENDIX A: VARIABLES DEFINITION
Financial literacy
Questions on financial literacy are as follows.
1) If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people out of 1,000 (one
thousand) would be expected to get the disease?
If the respondent answers question 1) correctly, she is then asked question 2):
2) A second-hand car dealer is selling a car for 6,000 [{local currency}]. This is
two-thirds of what it costs new. How much did the car cost new?
If the respondent answers question 2) correctly, she is then asked question 3):
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3) Let’s say you have 2000 [{local currency}] in a savings account. The account
earns 10% interest each year. How much would you have in the account at
the end of two years?
We set the variable ‘percentage calculation’ equal to 1 if the respondent answered
the first question correctly but not the second one, ‘lottery division’ equal to 1 if the
respondent answered the first two questions correctly but not the third one and
‘compound interest’ equal to 1 if she answered all the questions correctly.
Recall
The interviewer reads a list of 10 words and the respondent has up to one minute
to tell as many words as she can recall. The list includes the following words: but-
ter, arm, letter, queen, tickets, grass, corner, stone, book, stick.
Fluency
The respondent has one minute to name as many different animals as she can
think of. Any member of the animal kingdom, real or mythical is scored correct,
except repetitions and proper nouns.
Risk aversion
The respondents are asked which of the following statements come closest to the
amount of financial risk that they are willing to take when they save or make
investments:
1) Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns
2) Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns
3) Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns
4) Not willing to take any financial risks
The variable ‘low risk aversion’ is set equal to 1 if the respondent gives one of the
first two possible answers and 0 otherwise, while ‘medium risk aversion’ takes value 1 if
the respondent chooses the third statement and 0 otherwise.
Mobility limitations indicator
The variable mobility is equal to 1 if the respondent has at least three limitations
with mobility, arm function and fine motor functions. The activities include:
1) Walking 100 metres
2) Sitting for about two hours
3) Getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods
4) Climbing several flights of stairs without resting
5) Climbing one flight of stairs without resting
500 VIOLA ANGELINI, AGAR BRUGIAVINI AND GUGLIELMO WEBER
6) Stooping, kneeling or crouching
7) Reaching or extending your arms above shoulder level
8) Pulling or pushing large objects like a living room chair
9) Lifting or carrying weights over 10 pounds/5 kilos, like a heavy bag of groceries
10) Picking up a small coin from a table
Bad health
This variable is equal to 1 if self-perceived health is less than good (on a scale that
goes from excellent to very good, good, fair and poor).
# Chronic diseases
This variable presents the number of chronic diseases presented by each individual.
The chronic conditions include:
1) A heart attack including myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis or
any other heart problem including congestive heart failure
2) High blood pressure or hypertension
3) High blood cholesterol
4) A stroke or cerebral vascular disease
5) Diabetes or high blood sugar
6) Chronic lung disease such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema
7) Asthma
8) Arthritis, including osteoarthritis, or rheumatism
9) Osteoporosis
10) Cancer or malignant tumour, including leukaemia or lymphoma, but
excluding minor skin cancers
11) Stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer
12) Parkinson’s disease
13) Cataracts
14) Hip fracture or femoral fracture
15) Other fractures
16) Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, organic brain syndrome, senility or any other
serious memory impairment
17) Benign tumour (fibroma, polypus, angioma)
Social security wealth
Social security wealth is defined as the present discounted value of future (public) pen-
sion benefits conditional upon survival. In order to compute social security wealth
we need to compute the age profile of social security benefits the individual is enti-
tled to, the (future) retirement age and country-specific survival probabilities. A dis-
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tinction has to be drawn between respondents who are working and those who are
retired. For workers we make use of two sources of information available in
SHARE: the expected replacement rate (i.e. the ratio between the first expected
benefit and the last future wage), current earnings and the expected age of retire-
ment. Since SHARE does not have a long panel dimension we generate the growth
rate of earnings from external sources: the European Community Household Panel
for most countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Aus-
tria, Germany and Sweden) and the National Accounts for Switzerland. These
growth rates are country, gender and occupation specific (private sector employees,
public sector employees and the self-employed). On the basis of these growth rates
we build the individuals’ age-earnings profiles so that, together with the expected
replacement rate, we infer the first benefit future retirees are entitled to at the
expected retirement age. After this age, benefits grow according to the indexation
rules of the social security system in each country.
For retired people the stream of benefits is simply computed from the current
benefit applying the indexation rules of the country.
Social security wealth is then computed by applying the relevant survival probability
which is country specific (drawn from http://www.mortality.org and from EURO-
STAT for Greece, Poland and the Czech Republic) and a discount rate of 3% per year.
Potential social security wealth
His variable is computed according to the same definition and using the same infor-
mation as social security wealth with one important difference: the legal retirement
age is used in place of the subjective expected retirement age. This implies that also
the earnings level relevant for the benefit calculation changes accordingly (if the indi-
vidual reports an expected retirement age of 60 while the legal retirement age is 65
the earnings level which matter are the ones projected at age 65 rather than age 60).
Years from/to eligibility
For each country and year we compare current age with the earliest age at which
the individual became (will become) eligible for a job-pension. In the case of early
retirement schemes, potential years of contributions were computed for workers as
the difference between current age and the age the individual left full-time educa-
tion, for the retired as the difference between retirement age and the age the indi-
vidual left full-time education.
Employment status
The individual is defined as retired, worker or other non working conditions on the
basis of the self-reported labour market status available in SHARE (question EP005).
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APPENDIX B: STATUTORY OLD AGE, EARLY RETIREMENT AGE AND
ELIGIBILITY AGE
Austria
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 for men and 60 for women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 2001, 60 for men and 55 for women; from
2002 to 2004, 61 for men and 56 for women; from 2005 to 2007, 62 for both men
and women.
Belgium
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1998, 65 for men and 60 for women; from
1999 to 2003, 65 for men and 61 for women; from 2004 to 2005, 65 for men and
63 for women; from 2006 to 2007, 65 for men and 64 for women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1966, no retirement age; from 1967 to 1986,
60 for men and 55 for women; from 1987 to 1997, 60 for men and 60 for women;
from 1998 to 2007, 60+ years of contributions6 both for men and women.
Denmark
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2003, 67 both for men and women; from 2004
to 2007, 65 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1975, no early retirement; from 1976 to 1978,
60 for bothmen and women; from 1979 to 2007, 60 with 30 years of contributions.
France
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1994, 65 both for men and women; from 1995
to 2007, 60 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1994, 60 both for men and women; from
1995 to 2007, no early retirement. From 1961 to 2007, 55 for public transport and
electricity workers; from 2003 to 2007, 40 years of contribution for people who
started working as early as ages 14, 15 or 16.
Germany
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 both for men and women.
6 20 years of contributions (1998), 24 years of contributions (1999), 26 years of contributions (2000), 28 years of contributions
(2001), 30 years of contributions (2002), 32 years of contributions (2003), 34 years of contributions (2004), 35 years of contri-
butions (2005–7).
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Early retirement age: in 1961, no early retirement; from 1962 to 1972, no early
retirement for men and 60 + 15 years of contributions for women; from 1973 to 2007,
63 + 35 years of contributions for men and 60 + 15 years of contributions for women.
Italy
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1993, 60 (65 in the public sector) for men and
55 (60 in the public sector) for women; in 1994, 61 for men and 56 for women; in
1995, 61.5 for men and 56.5 for women; in 1996, 62 for men and 57 for women;
in 1997, 63 for men and 58 for women; in 1998, 63.5 for men and 58.5 for
women; in 1999, 64 for men and 59 for women; from 2000 to 2007, 65 for men
and 60 for women7 (both private and public sector).
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1964, no early retirement; from 1965 to
1995, 35 years of contributions (25 in the public sector) both for men and women;
from 1996 to 1997 in the private and public sector 52 + 35 years of contribution
(or 36 years of contribution independently of age), for self-employed 56 + 35 years
of contribution both for men and women; in 1998 the age is 53 for the public sec-
tor, 54 for the private sector and 57 for self-employed; in 1999 the age is 53 for the
public sector, 55 for the private sector and 57 for self-employed; in 2000, 54 for
the public sector, 55 for the private sector, 57 for self-employed; in 2001, 55
for the public sector, 56 for the private sector, 58 for self-employed; in 2002, 55 for
the public sector, 57 for the private sector, 58 for self-employed; in 2003, 56 for
the public sector, 57 for the private sector, 58 for self-employed; from 2004 to
2007, 57 for both the private and public sector, 58 for self-employed.8
The Netherlands
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1974 no early retirement; from 1975 to
1994, 60/61 + 10 years of work in a sector or firm both for men and women; from
1995 to 2007, 62 + 35 years of contributions both for men and women.
Spain
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1982, 64 both for men and women; from
1983 to 1993, 60 both for men and women; from 1994 to 2001, 61 both for men
and women; from 2002 to 2007, 61 with 30 years of contributions both for men
and women.
7 In the period from 1994 to 1999 the retirement age for the public sector does not change.
8 The requirements in terms of years of contributions remain the same in the period from 1996 to 2007.
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Sweden
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1994, 67 both for men and women; from 1995
to 2007, 65 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1962 no early retirement; from 1963 to 1997,
60 both for men and women; from 1998 to 2007, 61 both for men and women.
Switzerland
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1974, 65 for men and 63 for women; from
1975 to 2003, 65 for men and 62 for women; in 2004, 65 for men and 63 for
women; from 2005 to 2007, 65 for men and 64 for women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1990 no retirement age; from 1991 to 1997, 62
for men and 59 for women; from 1998 to 2004, 62 for men and 60 for women; from
2005 to 2006, 62 for men and 61 for women; in 2007, 63 for men and 62 for women.
Eligibility age
For each individual in our sample eligibility age is defined as the earliest age at
which she became (will become) available for a job-pension. For those who are
already retired, we take into account the legislation in place when they retired; for
workers, we consider current eligibility rules.
Table A1. Hausman tests
Variables Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 (1) Table 5 (2)
No stocks 0.6529*** 0.6693*** 0.3086 1.1755**
(0.2064) (0.2404) (0.2687) (0.5772)
e(no stocks) )0.3416 )0.3348 0.0219 )0.9385
(0.2095) (0.2445) (0.2739) (0.5811)
Debt but no mortgage 1.5674
(1.8723)
e(debt but no mortgage) )1.2957
Mean of eligibility age Standard deviation of eligibility age
Sweden 60.669 0.5006
Denmark 60.247 1.1878
Germany 61.487 1.9768
Netherlands 62.143 1.5313
Belgium 60.074 2.2552
France 59.287 1.8012
Switzerland 61.442 1.4431
Austria 57.447 2.9227
Spain 61.171 1.1207
Italy 49.135 5.5486
Continued
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Table A1. Continued
Variables Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 (1) Table 5 (2)
(1.8738)
Retired 0.7642 0.6508 1.3240 0.9533
(0.6032) (0.7658) (0.8286) (1.3514)
e(retired) )0.6022 )0.4966 )1.0341 )0.5549
(0.6104) (0.7729) (0.8382) (1.3686)
Years from retirement )0.0517 )0.0729 )0.2721*** 0.0947
(0.0384) (0.0450) (0.0797) (0.1679)
(Years from retirement)2 0.0046*** 0.0071*** 0.0104*** )0.0018
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0029)
e(years from retirement) 0.0552 0.0769* 0.2571*** )0.0834
(0.0392) (0.0459) (0.0804) (0.1691)
e((years from retirement)2) )0.0047*** )0.0072*** )0.0103*** 0.0018
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0029)
Years to retirement )0.0515 )0.0559 )0.2937 0.0103
(0.0919) (0.1119) (0.1919) (0.1511)
(Years to retirement)2 )0.0008 0.0013 )0.0114 )0.0073
(0.0055) (0.0070) (0.0121) (0.0103)
e(years to retirement) 0.0439 0.0303 0.2304 )0.0184
(0.0951) (0.1152) (0.1955) (0.1600)
e((years to retirement)2) 0.0002 )0.0034 0.0083 0.0069
(0.0057) (0.0072) (0.0125) (0.0107)
Wealth )0.0011*** )0.0009*** )0.0017*** )0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
e(wealth) 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 0.0014*** 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Social security wealth )0.0008*** )0.0009*** )0.0003* )0.0017***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006)
e(social security wealth) 0.0004** 0.0006*** )0.0001 0.0013*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Age 0.3314*** 0.6401*** 0.9446*** )0.4860
(0.0986) (0.1602) (0.2655) (0.3985)
Age2 )0.0030*** )0.0053*** )0.0070*** 0.0026
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0024)
Male 0.0864** 0.1088** 0.1370** )0.0671
(0.0356) (0.0467) (0.0548) (0.0714)
Couple 0.0026 0.0567 )0.0762 0.0862
(0.0367) (0.0468) (0.0507) (0.0859)
Household size 0.0859*** 0.0840*** 0.1169*** )0.0591
(0.0207) (0.0296) (0.0283) (0.0519)
Years of education )0.0127** )0.0153** )0.0278*** 0.0235**
(0.0049) (0.0062) (0.0079) (0.0109)
Bad health 0.0609 0.0417 0.0260 0.1304
(0.0477) (0.0648) (0.0562) (0.1086)
Mobility indicator 0.0321 0.0050 0.0696 0.0267
(0.0497) (0.0704) (0.0572) (0.1003)
# Chronic diseases 0.0740*** 0.0561*** 0.0795*** 0.0762***
(0.0113) (0.0181) (0.0166) (0.0263)
Fluency )0.0019 )0.0060 )0.0057 )0.0016
(0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0057)
Recall )0.0142 0.0036 )0.0138 )0.0068
(0.0099) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0206)
Home-owner )0.0898 0.1096 )0.2374***
(0.0581) (0.1056) (0.0771)
Continued
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Table A1. Continued
Variables Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 (1) Table 5 (2)
Denmark )0.0612 )0.0243 )0.1393
(0.1063) (0.1190) (0.1817)
Belgium 0.3301*** 0.2234**
(0.0921) (0.1027)
France 0.6215*** 0.3300 0.3469***
(0.0904) (0.2962) (0.0680)
Austria )0.4109** )0.3544** )0.4678***
(0.1787) (0.1801) (0.0921)
Spain 0.7446*** 0.6540***
(0.0906) (0.1106)
Italy 0.6048*** 0.4263** 0.4339***
(0.1608) (0.1769) (0.0929)
Netherlands )0.0651 )0.0333
(0.0837) (0.1268)
Sweden 0.1500 0.0458 0.1617
(0.1012) (0.1342) (0.1530)
Switzerland 0.2765*** 0.3601***
(0.0896) (0.1336)
Constant 10.1389*** )20.5904*** )31.8324*** 18.8005
(3.2137) (5.1342) (9.0483) (15.3717)
Observations 11469 8313 4760 3658
Note: INSTRUMENTS: low and medium risk version, rural, financial literacy for no_stocks. Number of rooms
for wealth and number of rooms interacted with rural. Potential SSW for SSW (computed on the basis of legal
rather than actual retirement age). Head eligibility for head retired (takes into account early retirement legisla-
tion by occupation and gender and potential years of contributions.) Workers or retired heads whose eligibility
cannot be established are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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